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Abstract
Recently, the H-1B visa program has been a target of reform under the Trump
administration. This study explores whether the employment of H-1B physicians in U.S.
hospitals has any effect on the quality of healthcare provided. As indicators of quality, I
use patient survey scores as well as mortality and readmission rates. This new
econometric evidence suggests that patient perception of quality is not influenced by
prejudice toward nonimmigrant physicians, but provides inconclusive results for the
rate-based measures of healthcare quality.

2

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Professor Pedace and Professor Bose for their patient guidance
and feedback throughout the process of drafting and completing my thesis. Under their
instruction, I became comfortable working with data and statistical programs as well as
conducting econometric analysis. This project would not have been possible without
them.
I would also like to thank my family for their unwavering support and for providing me
with the opportunity to attend Scripps. I greatly appreciate how much my success means
to them. I am very grateful to my dad for helping me find a topic that I was excited to
research and for taking the time to comment on my drafts, even in the middle of the
night. To my mom, thank you for all your encouragement, especially during the most
stressful periods. Finally, I want to thank my sister for always believing in me,
reminding me to stay on track when I get distracted, and sending me pictures of our
dogs to help me get through all the work.

3

Table of Contents
I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 5
II. Literature Review................................................................................................ 8
A.
B.
C.

The Impact of H-1B Visas on Labor Markets ............................................................ 9
Measures of Healthcare Quality .............................................................................. 11
Politics of Nonimmigrant Work .............................................................................. 12

III. Data.................................................................................................................. 13
IV. Model ............................................................................................................... 16
V. Results ............................................................................................................... 18
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Regression 1: HCAHPS Base Score ........................................................................ 18
Regression 2: HCAHPS Consistency Score ............................................................. 19
Regression 3: 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate ................................................ 20
Regression 4: 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate ........................................... 21
Regression 5: 30-Day Hospital-Wide Readmission Rate .......................................... 21

VI. Discussion ......................................................................................................... 22
VII. Appendix ........................................................................................................ 25
A. Variable Definitions .................................................................................................... 25
B. Tables ......................................................................................................................... 26

VII. References....................................................................................................... 30

4

I. Introduction
For many years, immigration policy has been a heavily controversial subject in
economic and political fields. The debate has been further intensified by the most recent
presidential campaigns and the subsequent election. Even at the most superficial level
of analysis, there is a definite relationship between immigration and the economy.
Immigration expands two economic parameters; the supply of workers in labor markets
and the total consumption of goods both increase with the number of migrants. Though
these results can be interpreted as beneficial for the economy, the debate lies mostly in
the increased competition for American citizens to gain employment. Roughly 13
percent of the U.S. population consists of immigrants, yet they make up 16 percent of
the labor force and own more small business than U.S.-born workers because they are
disproportionately concentrated at the peak working age range1. In the political
dimension, many legislators and citizens alike argue that immigration laws should
become more stringent to protect American jobs.
One of the latest targets for immigration policy reform is the H-1B visa
program. The H-1B program was created in 1990 to grant visas to skilled nonimmigrant
workers. Under the program, skilled workers are defined as having at minimum a
bachelor’s degree or the equivalent. Currently, the cap on foreign workers is 65,000 per
year, with an additional 20,000 granted to those who received a master’s or doctorate
degree in the U.S. The lottery by which the visas are granted has two stages. First, there
is a lottery for the 20,000 with advanced degrees. The secondary step is for the
bachelor’s degree category. Those who were not selected in the first round are entered
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Economic Policy Institute, “Facts About Immigration and the U.S. Economy”

into the drawing for 65,000 slots. If the cap is reached in the first 5 business days, there
is an additional preliminary lottery to decide which applications are processed. H-1B
visas are in such high demand that in every year since 2013, the cap has been reached
within this designated time period2. The visas are especially sought after by foreign
workers in STEM fields, such as engineering, computer science, architecture, and
medicine3. H-1B visas are effective for a period of three years, which can be extended
to six years through a second application.
Employers sponsoring H-1B petitions face certain economic stipulations put
forth by the Department of Labor to ensure they comply with the intention of the visa
program4. They must compensate foreign workers with either the set wage for the
position within the company or the prevailing wage in the industry set by state
employment agencies, whichever is higher. Sponsors are required to declare that the
hiring of H-1B workers will not have a negative impact on the working conditions of
other employees in the company. If for any reason work is halted (e.g. strikes), the
employer must notify the Department of Labor within 10 days. The final blanket
requirement for H-1B sponsors is creating a public access file for inspection with proof
of meeting all the stipulations. If greater than a certain percentage of employees are H1B workers, employers are obliged to declare that the foreign workers are not displacing
domestic workers as well as provide proof of attempts to recruit American workers.
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American Immigration Council, “The H-1B Visa Program: A Primer on the Program
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Citing the intent to keep jobs for domestic workers, in April 2017 the Trump
administration temporarily halted expedited processing for H-1B visas, under which
applications are reviewed within 15 days. Expedited processing was resumed on August
18th for first-time applicants, and on October 3rd for extended-stay petitions5. The need
for expedited processing becomes evident when taking into account that regular
processing for applications can take over six months.
For the healthcare industry, the removal of expedited processing may have
potentially adverse consequences. Over 1,500 non-citizens who were offered residency
positions at U.S. hospitals were put at risk of not receiving their visa in time by the
suspension of expedited processing6. Hospitals that hired foreign physicians for their
residency programs under the expectation that the visas would be quickly granted
suffered from issues related to insufficient staffing, which may include a reduction in
comprehensive individual care for patients, longer wait times for appointments, and
time spent searching for replacements. These costs could compromise the quality of
care that hospitals are able to provide for their patients. The staffing issues are
especially pronounced in rural areas, which already suffer from doctor shortages and
partially depend on the H-1B program to fulfill the healthcare needs of their
populations7. Because American doctors are typically disinclined to serve in these areas,
H-1B visa-holders constitute a high percentage of practicing physicians in rural towns.
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The defined question that this paper will explore is whether the hiring of
physicians with H-1B visas has an impact on the quality of healthcare that hospitals
provide. To answer this question, I will provide new econometric evidence. In the
following sections, I will analyze the existing literature from various branches of
economics, present my data, model, and results, and demonstrate my findings through
the research I have conducted.

II. Literature Review
While the impact of the H-1B visa program has been studied extensively in the
information technology industry, and there is a plethora of research on the quality of
medical care, literature regarding the effect of physicians with H-1B visas on the quality
of healthcare is scarce, if at all available. The lack of research is important to address.
Healthcare is one of the industries most affected by the H-1B program, behind
technology, with 8,100 applications submitted by medical professionals in 20168.
Additionally, healthcare is one of the largest industries in the U.S. If the quality of
services is in any way affected by the presence of skilled nonimmigrant workers, the
ability to measure that effect would be momentous. To overcome the research shortage,
we must synthesize two separate branches of economic research: labor markets and
healthcare. Because immigration is as much a political issue as an economic one, it is
also essential to consider existing research on policy.

8
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A. The Impact of H-1B Visas on Labor Markets
As mentioned before, studies regarding the impact of the H-1B program on
labor markets generally specific to the IT sector, being the predominant industry with
H-1B visa applicants. Two studies I reviewed had consistent results. The Bound et al.
2017 study compares the effects of the H-1B program on the IT sector in relatively open
and closed economies. In the sample, they analyze the recruitment of H-1B computer
scientists in the IT sector during the Internet boom from 1994 to 2001. They create two
predominant models: 1) a product market in which IT firms produce goods to sell to
consumers, and 2) a labor market for college graduates (i.e. skilled workers). The
models include maximization functions for firm profits and utility functions for
consumption. After statistical analysis, they conclude that in an open economy, the visa
program raises profits in the IT sector and contributes to innovation within the firms in
which it is implemented (Bound et al. 2017). More broadly, it can lower prices of goods
and increase consumption.
A noteworthy concern raised is that nonimmigrant workers might displace
domestic workers. The study states that critics of the program claim employers recruit
cheap foreign labor to replace domestic workers. The empirical evidence discovered
through their research appears to support this conclusion. Bound et al. 2017 finds that
the H-1B visa program crowds out domestic workers: the hiring of H-1B computer
scientists seems to cause domestic computer scientists to move into non-CS fields,
which lowers the average wages in the firms. When interpreting the results, Bound et al.
2017 suggests that the positive effects of the H-1B program may not fully offset the
negative ones.

9

An earlier study by Doran et al. 2014 has similar conclusions: the H-1B visa
program appears to result in lower average earnings and higher firm profits in the IT
sector. Doran et al. 2014 also finds evidence for the presence of a crowding out effect.
They argue that the crowding out effect is substantial enough that H-1B and non H-1B
workers might be perfect substitutes (Doran et al. 2014). This conclusion may be
extreme, especially when considering the cost to firms for sponsoring visa applications
as well as employer willingness to hire temporary workers with the knowledge that they
must be replaced in the foreseeable future.
By contrast, a third study contests the definitive conclusion of the crowding out
effect in H-1B sponsoring firms. Luthra 2009 argues there is existing empirical
evidence for both the presence and absence of the crowding-out effect, and as such, the
debate is more political than empirical. In a similar vein to Bound et al. 2017 and Doran
et al. 2014, Luthra claims that the H-1B program increases the flexibility of labor and
production in firms (Luthra 2009).
However, the Luthra 2009 study has a different focus. She analyzes whether the
likelihood of contingent employment varies between immigrants who have lived in the
U.S. for a time period shorter than six years (a group she uses as representative of H-1B
workers) and longer-term residents. The primary finding is that immigrants who have
been in the U.S. for fewer than six years are more likely to be contingent workers, and
empirical evidence supports that contingent workers receive fewer benefits than longterm employees. A secondary conclusion is that contingent workers do not receive
lower wages than permanent workers. Luthra 2009 also argues that H-1B visas are in
high demand despite their short-term disadvantages, such as fewer employment options
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and benefits, because the foreign workers who apply plan to eventually become U.S.
citizens. It would be interesting in future research to explore whether former H-1B
workers who become permanent residents create a long-term crowding out effect.

B. Measures of Healthcare Quality
Over time, measures of the quality of healthcare have been standardized by
researchers and healthcare professionals. Mainz 2003 defines and describes various
indicators of quality in his paper. He states that typically, these indicators are
established through existing evidence and literature or agreed upon by a panel of health
experts. The first category Mainz 2003 mentions is rate-based indicators, such as the
percentage of patients who are infected during surgery and the number of patients who
die in surgery. A second broad category is structure and process indicators, which
includes the proportion of specialists to other doctors, the number of beds in the
hospital, and the use of diagnostic technologies. Mainz 2003 claims that for the
indicators in this category to be reliable, they must be correlated with a desirable effect
on health outcomes. The aforementioned rate-based indicators, as well as patient
satisfaction, are examples of outcome indicators, and their usage is ideal for analyzing
long-term data (Mainz 2003).
In econometric studies, we see that the types of indicators Mainz 2003 details
are frequently used to evaluate quality of healthcare. Clark 2006 uses an outcome
indicator, creating a quantitative survey given to patients, physicians, and other hospital
employees to evaluate the quality of healthcare provided. He perceives these three
groups as “the three co-creators of health” (Clark 2006). His findings suggest that good
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organization and strong relationships between patients, physicians, and employees lead
to patient base retention and growth, which is reflective of the quality of care. He claims
such relationships determine a hospital’s success (Clark 2006).
Lichtenberg 2011 instead utilizes process and structure indicators to measure the
effect of healthcare quality on average life expectancy. He considers the percentage of
advanced diagnostic imaging procedures used, the percentage of physicians at a hospital
who attended top-ranking medical schools, and the average quality of prescription
drugs. Lichtenberg 2011 finds as the primary result that each of the three indicators is
statistically significant, and each increases the average life expectancy. Additionally,
Lichtenberg 2011 concludes that an increase in life expectancy is not correlated to
health insurance rates or education levels of patients, and that states increasing their
spending on diagnostic imaging do not have higher per capita medical expenditures.

C. Politics of Nonimmigrant Work
One researcher poses the question of whether the growth rates of various
nonimmigrant worker groups affect the likelihood of elected state officials passing EVerify policies (Udani 2016). Under these policies, employers are entitled to review the
work authorization of new employees to ensure they are legally working in the U.S. As
test groups, Udani 2016 focuses on H-1B workers (high-skilled) as well as H-2A and H2B workers (non-specialty, employed in agricultural and non-agricultural fields,
respectively). As explanatory variables, he considers annual state unemployment rate,
the percentage of Democratic officials in state legislatures, states using E-Verify as pilot
program, and whether neighboring states have enacted E-Verify policy within the
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previous year. In a second regression, Udani 2016 incorporates proxies for racial
prejudices; he uses the immigration rates from Asian countries to represent the model
minority stereotype, and the Mexican immigration rate as representative of the lowskilled labor stereotype.
In both models, the results are statistically significant. Udani 2016 finds that
states with high growth rates of H-1B workers adopt E-Verify policies more slowly,
while states with high growth rates of non-specialty immigrant workers pass these
policies more quickly. He argues that the high demand for H-1B workers supports
stereotypes of ‘good’ workers, and takes away the motivation to create legislation for
employee verification. Udani 2016 concludes state officials have ambiguous attitudes
toward immigration, and legislation is largely dependent on American perceptions of
immigrant groups, in which both class bias and racial bias have central roles.

III. Data
In creating my dataset for this empirical analysis, I collected data from four
different sources. The first source I encountered was the My Visa Jobs website, which
provided data on the number of certified, certified-withdrawn, denied, and withdrawn
applications sponsored from 2013 to 2016 by the top 100 sponsoring hospitals and
networks in the U.S. In my analysis, I decided to include only the number of certified
physicians. Initially, I had hoped to include data from these four years, but the Census
Bureau, another source I consulted, did not release demographic information for 2016
early enough for the purposes of this project. Thus, my dataset was constrained to 2015
on the upper side. For area characteristics, I noted whether each hospital was located in
13

an urban or rural area using U.S. News Health. Finally, I referred to archived Physician
Compare and Hospital Compare datasets made available by Medicare. The former
provided the total number of physicians per hospital and per network, and the latter
supplied data for my chosen dependent variables. The data is cross-sectional and
strongly balanced, organized by the generated hospital identification variable and year.
Descriptive statistics for each variable are listed in Table 1 in the Appendix. The
calculated sample means and standard deviations for the variables are reasonable, which
suggests a lack of major mistakes in collecting data.
As stated before, the number of H-1B certified physicians for the top 100
sponsoring hospitals and networks came from the My Visa Jobs website. Because my
goal was to measure the effect of the visa program on individual hospitals, an
immediate issue was to maximize the amount of available data used in my regressions.
As a solution, I gathered data on both dependent and explanatory variables for the
individual hospitals associated with each network. I created one dataset for individual
hospitals, and another for H-1B data for networks. Then, I created a network
identification variable to match individual hospitals to their respective networks.
Additionally, because there were multiple observations for each year, I created a
hospital identification variable. There were issues with repeat observations; some of the
hospitals for which individual data was reported were also included in networks, and
some were members of multiple networks. Another limitation was missing observations
for certain hospitals. After dropping those data points, the dataset included a total of 293
observations.
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For specific information about hospitals, I used archived Medicare datasets.
Medicare reported data on the number of physicians per hospital and per network in its
Physician Compare datasets, which was useful given the similar reporting of H-1B
certification. From this data, I calculated the percentage of physicians with H-1B visas
employed by individual hospitals and networks for every year. In the case of networks,
the same percentage was applied to each constituent hospital. However, Medicare did
not provide physician data prior to 2014. Under the assumption that the number of
physicians employed per hospital would not drastically vary between years, I repeated
the value given in 2014 for 2013. A second limitation was the unavailability of
physician data for certain hospitals in my dataset. For these hospitals, I used the value
listed on each hospital website as a repeat observation for each year. The Hospital
Compare datasets from 2013 to 2015 provided data on all the dependent variables:
HCAHPS base score, HCAHPS consistency score, the 30-day heart failure mortality
rate, the 30-day heart failure readmission rate, and the 30-day hospital-wide
readmission rate. The datasets also included whether each hospital was owned by the
government, a for-profit company, or a nonprofit; I included ownership as a potential
explanatory variable for quality of healthcare.
I utilized the Fact Finder tool to find information about the median inflationadjusted wage, median population age, and number of males per 100 females for the
cities in which the hospitals were located. With a higher median wage, the population in
question likely has a greater amount of disposable income, presumably leading to more
effective demand for a better quality of healthcare. Living in a city or town with higher
average wages may also be a source of attraction for physicians who seek to pay off
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their student loans. Median age may have a potentially large impact on the demand for
healthcare as well. Similarly, urban areas may be more appealing to physicians than
rural towns. It has been well-documented that medical needs increase with age. I chose
to include the number of males per 100 females in my regressions because men and
women have different healthcare needs, which may also affect the quality of services
provided by hospitals.

IV. Model
My model analyzes the effect of H-1B employment on the quality of healthcare
based on the five different dependent variables previously mentioned: HCAHPS base
score, HCAHPS consistency score, the 30-day heart failure mortality rate, the 30-day
heart failure readmission rate, and the 30-day hospital-wide readmission rate. I ran
linear multiple regressions with each dependent variable to examine the potential
impact of the program.
HCAHPS is a hospital scoring system based on patient evaluations regarding
eight different categories, including effectiveness of nurse and doctor communication,
pain management, and cleanliness9. Patients only fill out one HCAHPS survey, but two
separate scores are calculated. The base score is calculated out of 80 points, rewarding
hospitals for achievement and improvement in each of the eight categories. By contrast,
the consistency score is scored out of 20 points and reports hospitals’ lowest-performing

9
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category10. Because Medicare reported the scores independently, I decided to run
separate regressions rather than combining the scores into one variable. Although
patient surveys are not subjective indicators of quality of care, perception may have a
discernible effect on health outcomes. For example, patients who feel that they are
receiving high-quality care might experience a placebo-like effect that could contribute
to their healing process.
The remaining three dependent variables – heart failure mortality rate, heart
failure readmission rate, and hospital-wide readmission rate – I chose due to their status
as standard indicators for quality of healthcare. Accessibility also shaped my decision;
many of the reported variables in the Medicare datasets were not supplemented by a
code to explain the scoring system. The values for mortality and readmission were
widely available, and as each observation was a percentage, interpretation was
straightforward.
All five regressions were in the same format, with only the dependent variable
changing between regressions:

𝑌" = ℎ1𝑏 ∗ 𝑋") + 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝐷") + 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐 ∗ 𝑋"4 + ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑛1 ∗ 𝐷"4 + ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑛3
∗ 𝐷": + 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑋"< + 𝑚𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝑋": + 𝑢"

symbolically written as:

𝑌" = 𝛽) 𝑋") + 𝛽4 𝐷") + 𝛽< 𝑋"4 + 𝛽: 𝐷"4 + 𝛽A 𝐷": + 𝛽B 𝑋"< + 𝛽C 𝑋": + 𝑢"
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Here, h1b is defined as the percentage of physicians with H-1B visas at each
hospital. Areachar is a binary variable set equal to 0 if the hospital is in an urban area
and 1 if the hospital is rural. Medianinc is the median inflation-adjusted wage for the
population in the city or town where the hospital is located. Hospown1 is equal to 0 if
the hospital is government-owned, and hospown3 is equal to 0 if the hospital is
nonprofit. Medage is the average age of the population and mfratio is the number of
males per 100 females; both are specific to the hospital’s location.
My null hypothesis for the model was statistical insignificance of the
coefficients of all the explanatory variables (𝛽) = 𝛽4 = 𝛽< = 𝛽: = 𝛽A = 𝛽B = 𝛽C = 0).
To correct for heteroskedasticity, I conducted random-effects GLS regressions. I chose
random-effects over fixed-effects because the coefficients of my explanatory variables
did not change between the corrected and uncorrected regressions. I deemed it
unnecessary to correct for multicollinearity due to low R2 values in each regression,
which will be addressed in the results. Additionally, I decided not to correct for
autocorrelation, as my data was not time series.

V. Results11
A. Regression 1: HCAHPS Base Score
In the first regression, the only variables found to be statistically significant
were median inflation-adjusted wage (𝛽< = 0.00022, 𝑝 > |𝑧| = 0.000) and nonprofit
hospital ownership (𝛽A = −9.344, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.015). The magnitude of median wage

11

The full results of my statistical analyses are detailed in the index
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at first appears small enough to be negligible: with an increase of $1, the base score
increases by 0.00022 point. It is more compelling, however, to consider substantial
changes in median wage. With a $10,000 increase, for example, the base score is
expected to increase by 2.2 points. This may imply that the cost of living is so high that
income must considerably increase to make a substantial difference in the perceived
quality of healthcare.
Nonprofit hospital ownership has a more immediately obvious effect on the base
score. If the hospital is run by a nonprofit organization, the base score is expected to be
lower by 9.344 points than otherwise. Area characteristics are nearly statistically
significant (𝛽4 = 5.30, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.079). Perhaps with a larger sample size, I would
have found statistical significance. The model explains approximately 15.04 percent of
the variation in the HCAHPS Base Score.

B. Regression 2: HCAHPS Consistency Score
In the second regression, the median inflation-adjusted wage remains
statistically significant, with a coefficient of 0.0000439 and a p-value of 0.005. With a
$10,000 increase in median income, the consistency score is predicted to increase by
0.439 point. To compare the magnitude to that of the HCAHPS base score, I scaled the
base score down to 20 and found a predicted increase is 0.55 point for a $10,000
increase in median inflation-adjusted wage. When on the same scale, the coefficients
are similar, with roughly a 20 percent difference. This should not be surprising, given
the shared origin of the two scores. Again, it implies that a large change in income is
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required for a discernible difference in patients’ perception of the quality of healthcare
provided.
Area characteristics are also statistically significant in this regression: if the
hospital is in a rural area, the consistency score is expected to increase by 1.67 points
(𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.016). This model explains roughly 16.16 percent of the variation in the
HCAHPS Consistency Score.

C. Regression 3: 30-Day Heart Failure Mortality Rate
In the 30-day heart failure mortality rate regression, the median inflationadjusted wage is no longer statistically significant. Area characteristics are again found
to be significant. The mortality rate is predicted to be 1.24 percent higher in rural areas
in comparison to urban areas (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.000). One potential explanation for this
result is that hospitals may be farther or more difficult to access in rural areas, and
patients might not arrive in time for effective treatment.
Government hospital ownership is another statistically significant explanatory
variable, predicted to decrease the mortality rate by approximately 0.89 percent (𝑝 >
𝑧 = 0.015). One possibility is that government-run hospitals have stricter guidelines
for healthcare providers, leading to a lower mortality rate.
Of the five regressions, this is the only one to result in the statistical significance
of the percentage of H-1B physicians (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.003). For every 5 percent increase
in visa-holding physicians, the mortality rate is expected to increase by 0.245 percent.
This effect is miniscule and arguably economically insignificant. The model explains
approximately 13.8 percent of the variation in the 30-day heart failure mortality rate.
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D. Regression 4: 30-Day Heart Failure Readmission Rate
When running a statistical analysis on the 30-day heart failure readmission rate,
the only statistically significant explanatory variable is area characteristics (𝛽4 =
−1.10, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.001). The implication is that the heart failure readmission rate in
rural hospitals is 1.10 percent lower than in urban hospitals. It may be that rural
hospitals with fewer specialized physicians send patients to major hospitals in urban
areas, thus explaining the lower readmission rate.
In this regression, the male to female ratio is statistically significant at the 10
percent level, but not at the 5 percent level (𝛽C = −0.49, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.071). This result
might change with a larger sample size. The model explains roughly 12.52 percent of
the variation in the 30-day heart failure readmission rate.

E. Regression 5: 30-Day Hospital-Wide Readmission Rate
In the final regression, three explanatory variables are statistically significant:
area characteristics, median inflation-adjusted wage, and government ownership. If the
hospital is rural, the hospital-wide readmission rate is expected to decrease by 1.06
percent (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.000) as compared to urban hospitals. As stated before, this may
result from sending patients to major urban hospitals.
Median income has such a small effect on the readmission rate that it may be
negligible altogether. If income increases by $10,000, the hospital-wide readmission
rate decreases by roughly 0.08 percent (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.028).
Lastly, if a hospital is government-owned, the readmission rate is predicted to
decrease by about 1.06 percent (𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.026). A possible explanation is the fact
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that government-owned hospitals are penalized for high readmission rates. As a
consequence, they may admit less severe cases to keep their readmission rates low. The
model explains approximately 29.95 percent of the variation in the 30-day hospital-wide
readmission rate. In this regression again, the male to female readmission rate is only
significant at the 10 percent level (𝛽C = −0.027, 𝑝 > 𝑧 = 0.073).

VI. Discussion
Because the statistical significance of my explanatory variables is inconsistent
across the five regressions, the results of my empirical analysis are inconclusive.
Therefore, I cannot make any definitive claims regarding the effects of my explanatory
variables on the quality of healthcare. In one instance, the coefficients for an
explanatory variable (area characteristics) have opposite signs in regressions with
different quality indicators, indicating that overall hospital quality is much more
difficult to measure than I had previously anticipated.
The statistical insignificance of the percentage of H-1B physicians in the
regressions with patient survey results has compelling implications. It suggests that the
presence of H-1B certified physicians does not impact patient perception of care. More
importantly, this implies an absence of prejudice toward foreign workers in evaluating
the quality of care. Even if the results had been significant, the predicted change would
have been increased HCAHPS base and consistency scores, which is a fascinating
result. It does not appear to contradict existing literature. The finding that highly
educated nonimmigrant physicians are not perceived as providing an inferior quality of
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healthcare reflects the possibility of class bias rather than racial bias, which
complements the Udani 2016 results.
I was surprised that median population age was not significant in any of the five
regressions. It may be attributed to the limited range of median age in my sample; the
lower bound is 23.1 years and the upper bound is 53.1 years. Had I used a measure to
encompass the elderly population, I may have found that age has a significant impact on
the quality indicators of healthcare included.
There are a couple of limitations in my model that must be addressed in future
research. First, because my sample comes from the top 100 sponsoring hospitals and
networks rather than a random selection, there is potential for selection bias. I cannot
conclude for certain whether sponsorship is correlated with other factors related to
quality. Secondly, the potential exists for endogeneity. For example, an indicator of
quality might affect the number of applicants a hospital sponsors instead of the reverse,
which I specified in my model.
I was slightly disappointed by the low R2 values obtained from each regression,
but unsurprised by this result because there were additional explanatory variables I
wanted to include for which I could not find data. In future analysis, variables that I
would like to analyze are health insurance rates, the quality of education for both
physicians and the general population, whether the physicians were educated abroad or
in U.S., and the average physician salary. I would also like to expand my sample size in
subsequent work to observe whether statistical significance and the magnitudes of the
coefficients of my variables change.
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A point of future research might be to explore whether the H-1B visa program
has common labor market outcomes between the healthcare industry and the IT
industry. It would be interesting to discover whether physicians working in hospitals
that sponsor H-1B applications are subject to lower average wages and if there is a
crowding-out effect for domestic physicians. Given the shortage of doctors in rural
towns, I suspect that the crowding-out effect would be absent. The findings of such a
study could have major implications for immigration policy. Perhaps the cap on H-1B
visas might be revised, or a certain number of visas would be specifically designated for
medical professionals.
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VII. Appendix
A. Variable Definitions
h1b

percentage of phyicians per hospital that are H-1B visa holders

areachar

=0 if hospital in urban area, =1 if rural

medianinc

median income in the area in which a hospital is located

hospown1

=0 if hospital is government-owned

hospown2

=0 if hospital ownership is proprietary (omitted)

hospown3

=0 if hospital is nonprofit

mfratio

number of males per 100 females in area where hospital is located

HCAHPSbase

base patient satisfaction score (out of 80)

HCAHPScons

hospital consistency score as rated by patients (out of 20)

hfmr

30-day heart failure readmission rate

hfrr

30-day heart failure readmission rate

orr

30-day hospital-wide readmission rate
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B. Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard

Minimum

Maximum

Deviation
h1b

293

6.710634

5.95099

0

29.701

areachar

293

0.2264505

0.4480074

0

1

medianinc

293

47977.05

19621.76

25697

143017

hospown1

293

0.7610922

0.4271459

0

1

hospown3

293

0.2764505

0.4480074

0

1

medage

293

35.54812

5.397764

23.1

53.1

mfratio

293

92.88157

5.439808

70.6

116.2

HCAHPSbase 293

19.83959

13.7718

0

73

HCAHPScons 293

15.30034

3.895717

3
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hfmr

293

11.39966

1.925451

7.7

17.8

hfrr

293

22.31365

2.302787

15.9

28.6

orr

293

16.2785

1.262437

13.3

20.1
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Table 2: Coefficients and Standard Errors
Explanatory

Reg 1:

Reg 2:

Reg 3: HF

Reg 4: HF

Variable

HCAHPS

HCAHPS

Mortality

Readmission Overall

Base Score

Consistency

Rate

Rate

Score
H-1B

Area

Reg 5:
Readmission
Rate

.1215774

.0517644

.049244

-.0359008

.0149417

(.1684432)

(.0461279)

(.0157509)

(.0230185)

(.0148334)

5.295546

1.67405

1.248165

-1.102766

-1.058881

(3.015862)

(0.6951887) (.2931554)

(.3258784)

(.2104384)

.0002201

.0000439

.0000101

-5.10e-06

-8.29e-06

(.0000498)

(.0000151)

(.0000102)

(7.16e-06)

(3.77e-06)

-4.535456

-1.0859

-.8866656

-.6131255

-.9011608

(4.498514)

(1.923974)

(.3632007)

(.6622426)

(.4057055)

-9.344216

-2.922484

-.5251336

.6315021

.1124094

(3.827671)

(1.676985)

(.3488361)

(.6154594)

(.3729151)

-.1384387

-.0687482

-.001131

.0284989

-.0101258

(.3559948)

(.0687482)

(.0231396)

(.0316466)

(.0207126)

-.0174617

-.0048168

.0166812

-.0485827

-.027623

(.1890167)

(.0371325)

(.0190811)

(.0268757)

(.0153875)

20.80459

15.32706

9.509636

26.89952

20.43958

(23.94355)

4.950003

(2.198073)

(2.954671)

(1.701021)

Characteristics

Median
Income

GovernmentOwned

Nonprofit

Median Age

MF Ratio

Constant
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Table 3: Probabilities
Explanatory

Reg 1:

Reg 2:

Reg 3: HF Reg 4: HF

Variable

HCAHPS

HCAHPS

Mortality

Base

Consistency Rate

Score

Score

z=0.72

z=1.12

H-1B

Area

Reg 5:

Readmission Overall
Rate

Readmission
Rate

z=3.13

z=-1.56

z=1.01

P|z|=0.470 P|z|=0.262

P|z|=0.002 P|z|=0.119

P|z|=0.314

z=1.76

z=4.26

z=-5.03

z=2.41

z=-3.38

Characteristics
P|z|=0.079 P|z|=0.016
Median Income z=4.42

Government-

z=2.90

P|z|=0.000 P|z|=0.001

P|z|=0.000

z=0.99

z=-2.20

z=-0.71

P|z|=0.000 P|z|=0.004

P|z|=0.322 P|z|=0.476

P|z|=0.028

z=-1.01

z=-2.44

z=-2.22

z=-0.56

z=-0.93

Owned

Nonprofit

Median Age

MF Ratio

Constant

P|z|=0.313 P|z|=0.572

P|z|=0.015 P|z|=0.355

P|z|=0.026

z=-2.44

z=-1.51

z=0.30

z=-1.74

P|z|=0.015 P|z|=0.081

P|z|=0.132 P|z|=0.305

P|z|=0.763

z=-0.39

z=-0.00

z=-0.49

z=-0.70

z=0.90

P|z|=0.697 P|z|=0.487

P|z|=0.996 P|z|=0.368

P|z|=0.625

z=-0.09

z=0.87

z=-1.80

z=0.13

z=-1.81

P|z|=0.926 P|z|=0.897

P|z|=0.382 P|z|=0.071

P|z|=0.073

z=0.87

z=4.33

z=12.02

z=3.10

P|z|=0.385 P|z|=0.002
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z=1.03

z=9.10

P|z|=0.000 P|z|=0.000

P|z|=0.000

Table 4: 95% Confidence Intervals
Explanatory

Reg 1:

Reg 2:

Reg 3: HF

Reg 4: HF

Reg 5:

Variable

HCAHPS

HCAHPS

Mortality

Readmission

Overall

Base Score

Consistency

Rate

Rate

Readmission

Score
H-1B

Area

Rate

-.2085651

-.0386446

.0183728

-.0810162

-.0141312

.45172

0.1421734

.0801153

-.0092146

.0440146

-.6154351

0.3115055

.6735912

-1.741476

-1.471333

11.20653

3.036595

1.822739

-.4640564

-.6464299

0.0001225

0.0000142

-9.88e-06

-.0000191

-.0000157

0.0003177

0.0000736

.0000301

8.94e-06

-8.99e-06

-13.35238

-4.856819

-1.598526

-1.911097

-1.696329

4.281469

2.685019

-.1748054

.6848462

-.1059926

-16.84631

-.6209313

-1.20884

-.5747761

-.6184907

-1.842119

.3643455

.1585726

1.83778

.8433096

-.8361757

-.1825774

-.0454659

-.0335274

-.0507218

.5592984

.0869106

.0452397

.0905252

.0304701

-.3879276

-.0679615

-.0207171

-.101258

-.0577819

0.3530043

.0775951

.0540794

.0040926

.002536

-27.52534

5.625232

5.201492

21.10847

17.10564

67.21794

25.02889

13.81778

32.69057

23.77352

Characteristics

Median Income

GovernmentOwned

Nonprofit

Median Age

MF Ratio

Constant
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